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ABSTRACT 
Job scheduling system problem is a core and challenging issue in Cloud Computing. How to use Cloud computing resources 
efficiently and gain the maximum profits with job scheduling. Job scheduling system is one of the Cloud computing service providers’ 
ultimate goals. In this paper, firstly, by analysis the differentiated QoS requirements of Cloud computing resources users’ jobs, we 
build the corresponding non-pre-emptive priority M/G/1 queuing model for the jobs.Then, considering Cloud computing service 
providers’ destination which is to gain the maximum profits by offering Cloud computing resources, we built the system cost function 
for this queuing model. After that, based on the queuing model and system cost function, considering the goals of both the Cloud 
Computing service users and providers, we gave the corresponding strategy and algorithm to get the approximate optimistic value of 
service for each job in the corresponding no-pre-emptive priority M/G/1 queuing model. Finally, we also provide corresponding 
simulations and numeral results.Analysis and number results show that our approach for job scheduling system can not only guarantee 
the QoS requirements of the users’ jobs, but also can make the maximum profits for the Cloud computing service providers.While the 
economic case for cloud computing is compelling, the security challenges it poses are equally striking. In this work we strive to frame 
the full space of cloud-computing security issues, attempting to separate justified concerns from possible over-reactions. We examine 
contemporary and historical perspectives from industry, academia, government, and ―black hats‖. We argue that few cloud computing 
security issues are fundamentally new or fundamentally intractable; often what appears ―new‖ is so only relative to 
―traditional‖computing of the past several years. Looking back further to the time-sharing era, many of these problems already 
received attention. On the other hand, we argue that two facets are to some degree new and fundamental to cloud computing: the 
complexities of multi-party trust considerations, and the ensuing need for mutual audit ability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Job scheduling (JS) system is one of the core and challenging issues in a Cloud Computing system.Traditional job scheduling systems 
in Cloud (or Grid)computing only consider how to meet the QoS requirements for the resources users, they seldom consider how to 
make the maximum profits for the resource providers. Actually, a job scheduling system plays a very important role in how to meet 
Cloud computing users’ job QoS requirements and use the Cloud resources efficiently in an economic way. Usually,from the Cloud 
computing resources users’ sides (we use CCU stands for Cloud computing user), users always think which Cloud computing resource 
can meet their job QoS requirements for computing (such as the due time of job finishing, the computing capacity etc.), how much 
money they must pay for the Cloud Computing resources. While,from the Cloud Computing service providers (we use CCSP stand for 
Cloud Computing Service Provider) side, the CCSP always think how they can gain the maximum profits by offering Cloud 
Computing resources, apart from meeting the CCU’s job QoS requirements. To make these two ends.The economic case for cloud 
computing has gained wide spread acceptance. Cloud computing providers can build large data entersat low cost due to their expertise 
in organizing and provisioning computational resources. The economies of scale increase revenue for cloud providers and lower costs 
for cloud users. The resulting on-demand model of computing allows providers to achieve better resource utilization through statistical 
multiplexing, and enables users to avoid the costs of resource over-provisioning through dynamic scaling [12, 2].At the same time, 
security has emerged as arguably the most significant barrier to faster and more widespread adoption of cloud computing. This view 
originates from perspectives as diverse as academia researchers [12], industry decision makers [35], and government organizations 
[29, 3]. For many business-critical computations,today’s cloud computing appears inadvisable due to issues such as service 
availability, data confidentiality, reputation fate sharing,and others.To add to the confusion, some have citizen the term ―cloud 
computing‖as too broad [21]. Indeed, cloud computing does include established business models such as Software as a Service, and 
the underlying concept of on-demand computing utilities goes back as far as early time-sharing systems [17]. At the same time, the 
lack of consistent terminology for cloud computing has hampered discussions about cloud computing security. Thus, security 
criticisms of cloud computing have included a murky mix of ongoing and new issues. This context frames the genesis of our paper. 
We recognize that security poses major issues for the widespread adoption of cloud computing. However, secure or not, cloud 
computing appears here to stay. Thus, our ambition is to get past terminology issues (Section2) and attempt to sort out what are 
actually new security issues for cloud computing, versus broader and more general security challenges that inevitably arise in the 
Internet age. Our goal is to advance discussions of cloud computing security beyond confusion,and to some degree fear of the 
unknown, by providing acomprehensive high-level view of the problem space.We ground the development of our viewpoint in a 
survey of contemporaryliterature on cloud computing security, coupled with are view of historical work on early time-sharing systems 
and virtual 
Machine monitors. Contemporary discussions reveal security concerns that are indeed ―new‖ relative to computing of the past decade 
(Section 3); however, looking back several decades, many contemporary challenges have quite similar historical counterparts(Section 
4).We build the case that few of the security problems arising in cloud computing are in fact new, even though satisfactory solutions 
Council for Innovative Research                                                  International Journal of Computers & Technology 
www.cirworld.com                                                                    Volume 4 No. 2, March-April, 2013, ISSN 2277-3061 
341 | P a g e                                                    w w w . i j c t o n l i n e . c o m  
formany still will require significant development. The combined contemporaryand historical viewpoints allow us to identify a 
numberof research topics that deserve more attention (Section 5). On theother hand, we argue that two facets are to some degree new 
andfundamental to cloud computing: the complexities of multi-party trust considerations, and the ensuing need for mutual audit ability. 
 
  
                                          Fig-1: Clouding Computing 
THE CLOUD ONTOLOGY 
Cloud computing systems fall into one of five layers: applications, software environments, software infrastructure, software kernel, 
and hardware. Obviously, at the bottom of the cloud stack is the hardware layer which is the actual physical components of the system. 
Some cloud computing offerings have built their system on subleasing the hardware in this layer as a service, as we discuss in 
subsection IV-E. At the top of the stack is the cloud application layer, which is the interface of the cloud to the common computer 
users through web browsers and thin computing terminals. We closely examine the characteristics and limitations of each of the layers 
in the next five subsections. 
 Cloud Application Layer: 
The cloud application layer is the most visible layer to the end-users of the cloud. Normally, the users access the services provided by 
this layer through web-portals, and are sometimes required to pay fees to use them. This model has recently proven to be attractive to 
many users, as it alleviates the burden of software maintenance and the ongoing operation and support costs. Furthermore, it exports 
the computational work from the users’ terminal to data centres where the cloud applications are deployed. This in turn lessens the 
restrictions on the hardware requirements needed at the users’ end, and allows them to obtain superb performance to some of their cpu-
intensive and memory-intensive workloads without necessitating huge capital investments in their local machines. As for the providers 
of the cloud applications, this model even simplifies their work with respect to upgrading and testing the code, while protecting their 
intellectual property. Since a cloud application is deployed at the provider’s computing infrastructure (rather than at the users’ desktop 
machines), the developers of the application are able to roll smaller patches to the system and add new features without disturbing the 
users with requests to install major updates or service packs. Configuration and testing of the application in this model is arguably less 
complicated, since the deployment environment becomes restricted, i.e., the provider’s data canter. Even with respect to the provider’s 
margin of profit, this model supplies the software provider with a continuous flow of revenue, which might be even more profitable on 
the long run. This model conveys several favourable benefits for the users and providers of cloud applications, and is normally referred 
to as Software as a Service (SaaS). Sales force Customer Relationships Management (CRM) system [7] and Google Apps [8] are two 
examples of SaaS. As such, the body of research on SOA has numerous studies on compostable IT services which have direct 
application to providing and composing SaaS. Our proposed ontology illustrates that cloud applications can be developed on the cloud 
software environments or infrastructure components (as discussed in the next two subsections). In addition, cloud applications can be 
composed as a service from other cloud services offered by other cloud systems, using the concepts of SOA. For example, a payroll 
application might use another accounting SaaS to calculate the tax deductibles for each employee in its system without having to 
implement this service within the payroll software. In this respect, the cloud applications targeted for higher layers in the stack are 
simpler to develop and have a shorter time-to market. Furthermore, they become less error-prone since all their interactions with the 
cloud are through pretested APIs. Developed for a higher cloud-stack layer, the flexibility of the applications is however limited and 
this may restrict the developers’ ability to optimize their applications’ performance. Despite all the advantageous benefits of this 
model, several deployment issues hinder its wide adoption specifically, the security and availability of the cloud. 
Cloud Software Environment Layer: 
The second layer in our proposed cloud ontology is the cloud software environment layer (also dubbed the software platform layer). 
The users of this layer are cloud applications’ developers, implementing their applications for and deploying them on the cloud. The 
providers of the cloud software environments supply the developers with a programming-language-level environment with a set of 
well-defined APIs to facilitate the interaction between the environments and the cloud applications,as well as to accelerate the 
deployment and support the scalability needed of those cloud applications. The service provided by cloud systems in this layer is 
commonly referred to as Platform as a Service (PaaS). One example of systems in this category is Google’s App Engine [5],which 
provides a python runtime environment and APIs for applications to interact with Google’s cloud runtime environment. Another 
example is Sales Force Apex language [9] that allows the developers of the cloud applications to design, along with their 
applications’logic, their page layout, workflow, and customer reports.Developers reap several benefits from developing theircloud 
application for a cloud programming environment,including automatic scaling and load balancing, as well as integration with other 
services (e.g. authentication services, email services, user interface) provided to them through the PaaS-provider. In such a way, much 
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of the overhead of developing cloud applications is alleviatedand is handled at the environment level. Furthermore,developers have the 
ability to integrate other services to their applications on-demand. This in turn makes the cloud application development a less 
complicated task, accelerates the deployment time and minimizes the logic faults in the application. In this respect, a Hadoop [10] 
deployment on the cloud would be considered a cloud software environment, as it provides its applications’developers with a 
programming environment, i.e. map reduce framework for the cloud. Similarly, Yahoo’sPig [11], a high-level language to enable 
processing of very large files on the hadoop environment may be viewed as an open-source implementation of the cloud platform 
layer. As such, cloud software environments facilitate the process of the development of cloud applications.4C. Cloud Software 
Infrastructure Layer. The cloud software infrastructure layer provides fundamental resources to other higher-level layers, whichin turn 
can be used to construct new cloud software environments or cloud applications. Our proposed ontology reflects the fact that the two 
highest levels in the cloud stack can bypass the cloud infrastructure layer in building their system. Although this bypass can enhance 
the efficiency of the system, it comes at the cost of simplicity and development efforts. 
DISTRACTED BY DEFINITIONS 
The lack of a clear and widely accepted definition has posed a barrier to talking about cloud computing in general. Clearly ―cloud 
computing" is an evolving term, defined more by usage than by written documents. That said, overly broad use has lead to criticism 
that cloud computing ―include[s] everything that we already do" [21]. Similarly, splitting hairs on the precise definitions distracts us 
from the core technology issues. In this section, we briefly frame the definition we use for the remainder of our discussion.An ―early‖ 
(less than one year old!) effort at systematically framing cloud computing, ―Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud 
Computing,‖ defined cloud computing to include application software delivered as services over the Internet, and the hardware and 
systems software in the data enters that facilitate the services [12]. Key characteristics of cloud computing include the illusion of 
infinite hardware resources, the elimination of up-front commitment, and the ability to pay for resources as needed.This whitepaper 
spurred a flurry of follow-on cloud computing definitions and reports. For our purposes, the most notable of these is that published by 
the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [30]. NIST frames a broader definition, one that includes nearly all 
common terms used in cloud computing discussions and forms the basis for the NIST guide on cloud computing security [29]. It 
appears that other efforts may converge on a similar framing; most visibly, the European mirror effort to [29], a report from the 
European Network and Information Security Agency(ENISA), defines cloud computing in the same spirit as the NIST definition 
[3].According to the NIST definition, key characteristics of cloud computing include on-demand self service, broad network access, 
resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and metered service similar to autility. There are also three main service models—software as a 
service (SaaS), in which the cloud user controls only application configurations; platform as a service (PaaS), in which the cloud user 
also controls the hosting environments; and infrastructure as a service (IaaS), in which the cloud user controls everything except the 
data center infrastructure. Further, there are four main deployment models: public clouds, accessible to the general public or a large 
industry group; community clouds, serving several organizations;private clouds, limited to a single organization; and hybridclouds, a 
mix of the others.In keeping with this evolution, and because we believe the broadscope of the NIST definition enables us to 
encompass the full setof issues of interest, for the rest of this paper, we will talk about―cloud computing" in the spirit of the NIST 
definition. 
CONTEMPORARY ASSESSMENT 
In this section, we assess what appears new to cloud computing and what does not, so that we can identify the most challenging 
aspects of the cloud computing security threat model. 
 What is not new? 
With increased employment of cloud computing comes increasingly frequent cloud computing security incidents. Arguably many of 
the incidents described as ―cloud security" in fact just reflect traditional web application and data-hosting problems. The underlying 
issues remain well-established challenges such as phishing [4],downtime [24], data loss [38], password weaknesses [31], and 
compromised hosts running botnets [20]. The Twitter phishing incident provides a typical example of a traditional web security issue 
nowmiscast as a cloud computing issue [4]. In contrast, we find the recent Amazon botnet incident note worthy because it reflects one 
of the first known compromises of a major cloud provider [20],highlighting that servers in cloud computing currently operate 
as(in)securely as servers in traditional enterprise data centres’. In academia, cloud computing security has begun seeing the 
development of dedicated forums such as the ACM Cloud Computing Security Workshop, as well as dedicated tracks at major security 
conferences such as the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). To date, most papers published on 
cloud security reflect continuations of established lines of security research, such as web security [40, 13], data out sourcing and 
assurance [14, 18], and virtual machines [41, 34]. The field primarily manifests as a blend of existing topics, rather than a set of papers 
with an exclusive focus on cloud security, though there are exceptions, such as [32], which we discuss below.The ―black hat‖ 
community has also discovered cloud computing exploits that reflect extensions of existing vulnerabilities, with adedicated cloud 
security track emerging at Black Hat USA 2009.For example, username brute forcers and DebianOpen SSL exploit tools run in the 
cloud as they do in botnets [28]. Social engineering attacks remain effective—one exploit tries to convince Amazon Elastic Compute 
Cloud (EC2) users to run malicious virtual machine images simply by giving the image an official-sounding name such as ―fedora 
core" [28]. Virtual machine vulnerabilities also remain an issue [25], as does weak random number generation due to lack of sufficient 
entropy [37]. 
 What is new? 
For black hats, cloud computing offers a potentially more trust worthy alternative to botnets. While the recent brute-force 
presentation[28] claimed that using the cloud is presently more expensive than using botnets, another Black Hats presentation asserted 
that the botnet market likely suffers from the ―lemon market" problem,where the lack of trust and the inability to verify the quality of 
goods leads to a minimal volume of goods being exchanged [22].If this were the case, then attackers can find more reliable service in 
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cloud computing at a premium price.1 That said, botnets in the cloud are easier to shut down than traditional botnets.Also, because 
cloud computing introduces a shared resource environment,unexpected side channels (passively observing information)and covert 
channels (actively sending data) can arise. One noteworthy paper [32] tackles precisely this problem. The exposed vulnerabilities 
include ways to place an attacker virtual machine (VM) on the same physical machine as a targeted VM, and then to construct a side 
channel between two VMs on the same physical machine, which enables the SSH keystroke timing attack outlinedin [36]. This work 
also provides an example of research targeted exclusively at cloud computing. Another new issue comes from reputation fate-sharing, 
which has mixed consequences. On the plus side, cloud users canpotentially benefit from a concentration of security expertise atmajor 
cloud providers, ensuring that the entire ecosystem employs security best practices. On the other hand, a single subverter can disrupt 
many users. For example, spammers subverted EC2 and caused Spamha us to blacklist a large fraction ofEC2’s IP addresses, causing 
major service disruptions. There1Note that the prices can be quite low. For example, we estimatethat to reduce the brute force exploit 
in [36] to a single minute,rather than 1.3 PC-days, would require 200 extra-large EC2 instances,which at January 2010 pricing would 
total at about $2 per exploit. After, if someone wants to send email from EC2, they must fill out the form 
(http://aws.amazon.com/contact-us/ec2-email-limit-request/), provide a list of (static) EC2addresses to authorize for sending, and 
document their use-case.Upon approval, Amazon forwards the EC2 addresses to Spamhaus for whitelisting [8].A second note worthy 
fate-sharing incident occurred during an FBIraid on Texas data enters in April 2009, based on suspicions of the targeted data enters 
facilitating cyber crimes. The agents seized equipment, and many businesses co-located in the same data enterfaced business 
disruptions or even complete business closures. One affected customer applied for a temporary restraining order, and was denied 
because the equipment concerned may have been used for criminal activities without the customer’s knowledge [6]. 
Novelties in the cloud threat model 
Putting together these discussions, we argue that the cloud computing threat model includes several novel elements.First, data and 
software are not the only assets worth protecting.Activity patterns also need to be protected. Sharing of resources means that the 
activity of one cloud user might appear visible to other cloud users using the same resources, potentially leading to the construction of 
covert and side channels. Activity patterns may also themselves constitute confidential business information, if divulging them could 
lead to reverse-engineering of customer base, revenue size, and the like.Business reputation also merit protection. When using shared 
resources to do business-critical computations, it becomes harder to attribute malicious or unethical activity. Even if there are ways to 
clearly identify the culprits and attribute blame, bad publicity still creates uncertainty that can tarnish a long-established reputation.In 
addition, one must often accommodate a longer trust chain. For example, the application end-user could potentially use an application 
built by an SaaS provider, with the application running ona platform offered by a PaaS provider, which in turn runs on the  
infrastructure of an IaaS provider. While to our knowledge this extreme example cannot occur in practice today due to a lack of 
sufficient APIs, it illustrates that with any model of cloud computing,stakeholders’ can find themselves with relationships considerably 
more complicated than simply a provider-user relationship.Some participants could be subverters, who maintain the appearance of a 
regular cloud user or cloud provider, but in fact perpetrate cybercrime or other cyber attacks. Examples include cloud users who run 
brute forcers, botnets, or spam campaigns from the cloud; or cloud providers who scan cloud users’ data and sell confidential 
information to the highest bidder.Furthermore, competitive businesses can operate within the same cloud computing ecosystem: using 
the same cloud or ending upin a provider-user relationship. This can lead to strong conflicts of Interest, and creates additional motives 
to access the confidential information of a competitor. These complications point to the need for audit ability in cloud computing—
already a requirement for health care, banking, and similar systems. What is new to cloud computing is mutual audit ability.Because 
the system includes stakeholders with potentially conflicting interests, cloud users and providers both need reassurance that the other 
in a fashion that is both benign and correct(from a billing standpoint).Mutual audit ability can also significantly assist with incident 
response and recovery, since both the cloud provider and the cloud user could be either the source or the target of an attack. Audit 
ability also enables the attribution of blame in search and seizure incidents, which can prove vital so that law enforcement agencies 
donot overreach in carrying out their duties.Finally, a subtle difficulty with understanding cloud computing threats arises from 
potentially inaccurate mental models of cloud computing as an always-available service. This viewpoint—which arises from the 
general paradigm of drawing upon a commodity service with much the flavour of a utility—can create a false sense of security, 
leading to inadequate security good practices, such as regular data backups across multiple cloud providers. As such, we could find 
that while cloud computing fails at the same rate as other types of systems, the impact of those failures manifest more severely. 
FINAL THOUGHTS  
Given the stakes, it strikes us as inevitable that security will become a significant cloud computing business differentiator. 
Furthermore,in addition to revisiting approaches for specific issues insecuring shared computing, history teaches us that developing 
security architectures early in the process can pay off greatly as systems evolve and accrue more disparate functionality. On the 
otherhand, the history of commercial Internet offerings repeatedly showsthat time-to-market and undercutting prices can greatly sway 
customer seven in the absence of sound security under pinnings. The situation may be somewhat different this time around, 
however,given that much of cloud computing targets customers who haveextensive business reasons (and scars from the past) leading 
themto treat security as an elevated priority.We close our discussion with what we find to be an interesting analogy.Companies such as 
National CSS began by offering affordable computation for businesses. Time-sharing eventually gave way to personal computers, 
which brought affordable computation to the general public. In a similar fashion, cloud computing currently offers affordable, large-
scale computation for businesses. If the economic case prevails, then we may find that nothing—not even security concerns—will 
prevent cloud computing from becoming a consumer commodity. Just as the commodity PC and the Internet brought about the 
Information Revolution, and made information universally accessible, affordable, and useful, so too does cloudcomputing have the 
potential to bring about the Computation Revolution,in which large-scale computations become universally accessible,affordable, and 
useful. Let’s hope we can add to this outcome―and be reasonably safe‖. 
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